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BURDEN OF PLEADING-GUEST STATUTE AND
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ROBERT E. LEACH*
Too often problems of pleading are thought of by the practitioner
as only procedural problems or matters of form without reference to
the substantive law involved. Too often a petition is but a synopsis of
the story related by the client followed by the prayer. Any considera-
tion as to the burden of pleading in any type of case necessarily
involves and to a large extent must be governed by a determination
as to the burden of proof. Questions as to the burden of proof are
questions of substantive law.
By the terms of Ohio Revised Code section 2309.04, the petition
must contain a statement of facts constituting a cause of action in
ordinary and concise language. Where liability is predicated on the
violation of a legal duty, the petition should set forth the facts from
which the obligation or duty is supposed to arise.' Thus the petition
must aver all essential facts constituting the cause of action, varying,
of course, with the nature of the case or the remedy sought.
It would seem to be axiomatic that the plaintiff has the burden of
proof as to those essential facts necessary to show the violation by the
defendant of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff.
By the terms of Ohio Revised Code section 2309.13, the answer
may contain not only a general or specific denial of each material al-
legation of the petition controverted by the defendant, but also a
statement in ordinary and concise language of new matter constituting
a defense or counterclaim. What is "new matter" constituting a de-
fense? It refers to something relied on by the defendant, extrinsic to
matters set up by the plaintiff in the petition, which, if true, con-
stitutes a defense to the action.2 The term manifestly implies something
not relating to denials, something which is not a mere traverse of the
allegations of the petition.' The term "new matter" embraces matters
of confession and avoidance as understood at common law.4 While a
defendant may also deny the allegations of the petition by general or
specific denial, he may, in addition thereto, assert in effect that, even
if prima facie liability be established by proof of the essential allega-
* judge, Common Pleas Court, Franklin County, Ohio. Member Ohio and Colum-
bus Bar Associations.
I Jurgan v. Chair Products Co., 3 Ohio L. Abs. 196 (1925); McBride v. Tyler Co.,
3 Ohio L. Abs. 698 (1925).
2 Leedle v. Christie, 15 Ohio C.C.R. (ns.) 385 (1913).
3 Corrigan v. Rockefeller, 5 Ohio N.P. 338, 8 Ohio Dec. 14 (1898).
4 43 Ohio Jur. 2d "Pleadings" § 120; 41 Am. Jur. "Pleadings" § 156.
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tions of the petition, such prima facie liability is defeated by proof of
the "new matter" alleged in the answer.
By way of illustration of this principle, it is clear that while a
defendant by way of evidence and argument may assert that plaintiff's
injuries were caused solely by his own negligence, or that they were
caused solely by the negligence of a third person, such assertions and
the ultimate facts in support thereof are not "new matter" but are
merely a denial of the allegations of the petition.5 The indiscriminate
intermingling of new matter, general denial, and specific denial in a
pleading, with no apparent attention to the order in which they are set
forth, is not authorized by the Revised Code and is not approved.6
As a basic proposition, it is clear that a party never has the bur-
den of pleading facts as to which he does not have the burden of
proof. In certain situations an issue may arise in a case without the
necessity of any pleading relative thereto. Contributory negligence 7
and assumption of risk8 are among the exceptions to the rule that
defensive matter, as to which a defendant has the burden of proof, are
required to be specially pleaded.'
GUEST STATUTE
Prior to June 15, 19332 the right of recovery by a guest from
the operator of a motor vehicle was based on the common law prin-
ciples of negligence and proximate cause. At that time the guest statute
became law, since recodified as Revised Code section 4515.02, provid-
ing:
The owner, operator, or person responsible for the operation of a
motor vehicle shall not be liable for loss or damage arising from
injuries to or death of a guest, resulting from the operation of said
motor vehicle, while such guest is being transported without payment
therefor in or upon said motor vehicle, unless such injuries or death
are caused by the willful or wanton misconduct of such operator,
owner, or person responsible for the operation of said motor
vehicle.
A similar statute is also in effect as to the operation of aircraft."0
G Sole negligence of plaintiff: Hanna v. Stoll, 112 Ohio St. 344, 147 N.E. 339
(1925); Duncan v. Evans, 60 Ohio App. 265, 20 N.E.2d 729 (1937).
Sole negligence of third party: Montanari v. Haworth, 108 Ohio St. 8, '140 N.E.
319 (1923); Hatsio v. Red Cab Co., 77 Ohio App. 301; 67 N.E.2d 553 (1945).
6 Zetzer v. Lundgard, 95 Ohio App. 51, 117 N.E.2d 445 (1953).
7 Fries v. Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 138 Ohio St. 537, 37 N.E.2d 193 (1941); Bradley
v. Cleveland Ry. Co., 112 Ohio St. 35, 146 N.E. 805 (1925).
8 Centrello v. Basky, 164 Ohio St. 41, 128 N.E.2d 80 (1955).
9 For other exceptions see 43 Ohio Jur. 2d "Pleadings" § 138.
10 Ohio Rev. Code 4561.151 (1955).
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The case law in Ohio to date has been limited to considerations of
the motor vehicle guest statute.
Where the plaintiff pleads facts showing a status as a "guest,"
he must both plead and prove facts sufficient to make a jury issue as
to willful or wanton misconduct. His burden both of pleading and of
proof in such respect is well understood. The question of what facts
are sufficient as a matter of law to constitute "willful or wanton mis-
conduct" or to permit a jury to so conclude, has been and will continue
to be the subject of continuous litigation." Any intelligent discussion
of the substantive law in such respect, as decided by the seemingly
endless reported cases on this subject, cannot be contained in a dis-
cussion as to the burden of pleading except to note that a pleader
should examine such substantive law before pleading, not after.
Where the plaintiff admittedly occupies a status other than that
of a "guest," which for the purposes of simplification I shall refer to
as a "passenger,"1 he has, of course, the burden of alleging and prov-
ing facts establishing negligence and proximate cause. This creates no
peculiar pleading problems other than those inherent in pleading any
negligence case and is relatively well understood and accepted.
A pleading problem peculiar to the guest statute does arise where
the plaintiff is asserting that he is a "passenger" and defendant is
asserting that plaintiff is a "guest." Must plaintiff plead facts to show
that he is not a "guest being transported without payment therefor"
or must defendant plead facts to show that he is such a "guest"? On
this question there is some divergency of legal opinion. More ac-
curately stated, there is some divergency of legal opinion as to where
the burden of proof lies, it being accepted that the burden of pleading
properly rests on the party having the burden of proof.
In Dobbs v. Sugioka,'3 the opinion stated that the guest statute
deprived one within its terms of a right theretofore existing, is in
derogation of the common law, should be strictly applied, and "hence
one relying on the guest statute has the burden of clearly establishing
that claimant was a guest." The Dobbs case has been cited as au-
thority for the proposition that defendant should have the burden of
pleading and proof as to the "guest" status of the plaintiff.' 4 Actually,
a careful reading of the Dobbs case reveals that the facts as to the
"guest" status of the plaintiff were not in dispute. The question in-
volved simply a judicial interpretation of the Colorado guest statute
as applied to particular facts and not a determination as to the burden
11 See 6 Ohio Jur. 2d "Automobiles" §§ 226, 227.
12 For simplification, this terminology has been used in opinion of the Ohio Su-
preme Court. See Burrow v. Porterfield, 171 Ohio St. 28, 168 N.E.2d 137 (1960).
23 117 Colo. 126, 185 P.2d 784 (1947).
14 Note, 21 U. Cin. L. Rev. 66 (1952).
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of pleading or the burden of proof as to facts. In this respect the Dobbs
case is similar to the syllabus holding of the Ohio Supreme Court in
Clinger v. Leman 5 that the guest statute "being in derogation of the
common law, is to be strictly, albeit reasonably, construed."
In Hasbrook v. Wingate' and Ames v. Seibert,17 the Ohio Su-
preme Court has held in the syllabi 8 that under the guest statute a
person seeking to recover from another person for injuries suffered
because of the latter's negligent operation of a car in which the
injured person was "riding," has the burden of showing that he paid
or agreed to pay for his transportation. The Ames holding differed
from the Hasbrook holding only by the addition of the words "ex-
pressly or impliedly" agreed to pay. Actually the literal language
employed by the Ohio Supreme Court in these two cases is too broad
since it would require a "rider" who, for reasons not concerned with
payment or non-payment, was not a guest,19 to prove payment or an
agreement for payment. However, these cases do seem to have decided
unequivocally that the burden is on the plaintiff if riding in an auto-
mobile driven by the defendant, to prove facts which show a status
other than that of a "guest without payment therefor." It would fol-
low, therefore, that in Ohio he has the burden of alleging such facts.
The rule as to the burden of proof announced in the Hasbrook
case and the Ames case is the same as that adopted in other jurisdic-
tions with guest statutes." All of the cases specifically discussing
pleading have held that such burden is on the plaintiff.21
Should such burden, both of proof and of pleading, be on the
15 166 Ohio St. 216, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957).
16 152 Ohio St. 50, 87 N.E.2d 87 (1949).
17 156 Ohio St. 45, 99 N.E.2d 905 (1951).
18 The syllabi of the Ohio Supreme Court state the law decided by that court as
distinguished from individual opinions which might be expressed in the body of an
opinion by a judge. See 14 Ohio Jur. 2d "Courts" § 247.
19 In Lombardo v. De Shance, 167 Ohio St. 431, 149 N.E.2d 914 (1958), the
opinion of Taft, J. notes that a kidnapped person or one forced against his will to ride
in an automobile is not a "guest" even though no payment is made for his transporta-
tion. In Redis v. Lynch, 169 Ohio St. 305, 159 N.E.2d 597 (1959), the court in a per
curiam opinion held that the petition therein raised a question of fact as to whether
plaintiff's status as a guest continued beyond the point of her alleged protests as to the
alleged change in course taken by the automobile.
20 Kruzie v. Sanders, 23 Cal. 2d 237, 143 P.2d 704 (1943); McDougold v. Coney,
150 Fla. 748, 9 So. 2d 187 (1942) ; Leonard v. Stone, 381 Ill. 343, 45 N.E.2d 620 (1943);
Pilcher v. Erney, 155 Kan. 257, 124 P.2d 461 (1942); Walker v. Lloyd, 295 Mass. 507, 4
N.E.2d 306 (1936); Baker v. Costello, 300 Mich. 686, 2 N.W.2d 881 (1942); Rowe v.
Rowe, 119 S.W.2d 194 (Ct. of Civil Appeals, Texas, 1938); Hayes v. Brower, 39 Wash.
2d 372, 335 P.2d 482, 25 A.L.R.2d 1431 (1951).
21 The McDougold, Walker, Baker, Rowe, and Hayes cases, supra note 20, also
hold that the burden of pleading the non-guest status is on the plaintiff.
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plaintiff? In the field of legal writing it has been asserted that the
decisions so holding have not made a real analysis of the problem
and that since the guest statute deprives one of rights under the
common law, the defendant should have the burden of pleading and
proof in such respect22 It has been argued that he who benefits from
a statute has the burden of pleading and proving such statute23
It is true that most of the cases so holding have not discussed
the reason for such holding except to make reference to the state's
civil procedure statutes which in essence require a statement of facts
constituting a cause of action. Implicit within such reference is the
basic legal principle that to recover damages from another, the person
seeking such damages has the burden of proof as to (1) those facts
which disclose the legal duty and (2) those facts which show a viola-
tion of such duty. This principle was recognized by Judge Hart in the
Hasbrook case when he stated that:
Since the liability of the motorist host to a person riding with him
depends on the status of the latter, he, the latter, has the burden
of establishing such relationship as entitles him to recover ....
Critics of these cases, in my opinion, have failed to distinguish
between matters of construction or interpretation of the statute, where
the fact that a statute is in derogation of the common law is a matter
to be considered,24 and the unrelated questions concerning the burden
of proof and the burden of pleading which involve facts. Where the
legal duty only exists under certain facts and where the right of re-
covery is predicated on a violation of such legal duty, it should follow
that the person seeking recovery should have the burden of pleading
and proving the facts from which the duty arises. It would seem to
make no difference in pleading or proof whether such legal duty arises
from common law, is created by statute, or exists by virtue of a
statutory limitation of a previous common law duty. The duty is a
matter of law in any event. The facts to bring a person within the
benefits flowing from a violation of the duty is a matter of pleading
and proof.
It also has been asserted that to require a plaintiff to plead and
prove a "non-guest" status is to require him to support the negative
and that such would violate the accepted principle that he who affirma-
tively asserts has the burden. This specific assertion also has been
rejected.2 Here we are dealing in a matter of semantics. Where a
22 Note 21, U. Cin. L. Rev. 66 (1952). The question was also considered in So
Ill. BJ. 66 (1941).
23 In Ohio a court takes judicial notice of the statutes which therefore are neither
pleaded nor proved.
24 50 Ohio Jur. 2d "Statutes" § 284.
25 Baker v. Costello, 200 Mich. 686, 2 N.W.2d 881 (1942).
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plaintiff in a state with a guest statute is predicating recovery on
common law negligence, his affirmative duty is to show that defendant
had a legal duty of exercising such care. While, in the words of the
statute, the defendant owes such duty to the plaintiff only in the
event that plaintiff is not a."guest being transported without payment
therefor," such language is merely a matter of legislative draftsmen-
ship and should not obviate the necessity of affirmative proof of
facts to establish the existence of such duty.
What facts are necessary to establish a "non-guest" status has
been the subject of many decisions in Ohio. 0 Most of the Ohio Su-
preme Court decisions on this subject to the date of that opinion are
noted in the opinion of Judge Matthias in Burrow v. PorterfieldF
Within the limitations of the subject matter here under considera-
tion, it is impossible to discuss the many refinements of the substan-
tive law of Ohio as to what facts establish the "rider" in a "non-guest"
status. As a matter of pleading as well as proof, however, the skilled
pleader must have a basic understanding of such substantive law as
a necessary predicate for successfully stating a cause of action.
It has been held that wanton misconduct and ordinary negligence
are joinable in the same case.2 8 Thus separate causes of action may
be contained in the same petition, one basing a claim of recovery on
a "non-guest" status and negligence, the other being based on a
"guest" status and willful or wanton misconduct.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
The problem as to the burden of pleading facts to bring a case
within the last clear chance doctrine cannot be approached entirely
independently of the substantive law of such doctrine. This facet of
legal reasoning, sometimes described as the "doctrine of discovered
peril," "doctrine of supervening negligence," "the last opportunity,"
and the "humanitarian doctrine," is recognized in legal writings as
being traced to the celebrated case of Davies v. Mann. 9 In effect, the
judge by his instructions in the Davies case permitted the jury to
conclude that the prior negligence of the plaintiff in leaving his
donkey on the highway so fettered as to prevent it from getting out of
the way of carriages did not preclude recovery against defendant,
who subsequently drove his carriage negligently against it. In the
application of the basic rule of contributory negligence-the rule that
plaintiff is barred from recovery if he be negligent and if his negligence
26 See 6 Ohio Jur. 2d "Automobiles" § 220.
27 171 Ohio St. 28, 168 N.E.2d 137 (1960).
28 Universal Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bassett, 130 Ohio St. 567, 200 N.E. 843 (1936).
29 10 Mees. & W. 548, 152 Eng. Reprint 588, 19 Eng. Rul. Cas. 190 (1842).
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also be a proximate cause of his own damage-the Davies case would
appear to be merely an application of such rule, not an exception
thereto. In effect, the jury was permitted to conclude that the negli-
gence of the plaintiff was not a proximate cause of his own damage
but only a remote cause.
While many cases as to last clear chance have spoken of such
doctrine as an exception to the rule of contributory negligence being
a bar to recovery, such cases seem to be employing the term "con-
tributory negligence" without including the basic ingredient of proxi-
mate cause. The substantive law of last clear chance has been the
subject of extensive annotations.30
In the ordinary case where the issue of potential contributory
negligence is involved, the court defines the term proximate cause in
general principles-as being the natural and probable consequence of
the negligence claimed." In cases involving last clear chance, however,
the issue of proximate cause has been explained in more specific terms
and the jury told, in effect, that if it finds that plaintiff's injuries or
damages were proximately caused by the subsequent negligence of
the defendant under the applicable principles of last clear chance,
the prior negligence of plaintiff in placing himself in a position of
peril should be (or in some cases might be) considered as a matter of
law a remote and not a proximate cause. It would appear that the
doctrine of last clear chance is only the application of the rule of
remote cause as contrasted with proximate cause in its specific applica-
tion to certain facts, and thus is merely an expanded or detailed
further definition of those terms as applicable to "prior" or "subse-
quent" negligence.
The scope of last clear chance and its applicability to a given
set of facts is a matter as to which there is little uniformity of opinion.
There is basic agreement that plaintiff must be in a position of "peril."
There is disagreement as to whether the doctrine only extends to
cases where defendant actually had knowledge of the position of
"peril" and thereafter failed to exercise ordinary care (when the ex-
ercise of ordinary care after discovery would have avoided injury)
or whether it also includes situations where defendant in the exercise
of ordinary care should have discovered plaintiff's position of "peril."
There is also disagreement as to the extent of the doctrine as applied
to the question of whether plaintiff must be in a position where he
could not physically extricate himself from such position of peril or
whether the plaintiff is merely charged with the duty of ordinary care
at such time (and assuming prior negligence in getting himself in
30 See 92 A.L.R. 47; 119 A.L.R. 1041; 171 A.L.R. 365.
31 39 Ohio Jur. 2d Negligence §§ 29, 30, 31.
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that position). Disagreement also exists as to what constitutes a posi-
tion of "peril" and the extent to which defendant must recognize the
full scope of such "peril.2
32
Prior to Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Masterson,33 considerable confusion
existed in the reported Ohio cases as to whether last clear chance was
applicable on the basis that defendant in the exercise of ordinary care
should have discovered plaintiff's position of peril." That case held
unequivocally that last clear chance is only applicable where de-
fendant "did not, after becoming aware of plaintiff's perilous situation
exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring him" and that an instruction
that plaintiff's negligence "would not preclude recovery if defendant
failed to exercise ordinary care 'after he saw or in the exercise of
ordinary care should have seen' the plaintiff in a dangerous situation,
is erroneous." The requirement of actual knowledge has been followed
in subsequent cases.35
Ohio seemingly does not require that the plaintiff be in a position
of "peril" from which it is physically impossible to escape. Where a
plaintiff came upon an interurban track and there stalled her car
and instead of immediately leaving it, as did some of her passengers,
attempted to start it and then too late attempted to get out, the last
clear chance doctrine has been applied where defendant failed "to
reasonably exercise his 'last clear chance' to avoid injury after be-
coming aware of plaintiff's perilous position."36 The court held that
the test to be applied to the plaintiff in relation to the attempted escape
was "what an ordinarily prudent person, faced with the same or similar
emergency... would have done."
'3 7
32 See A.L.R. annotations, supra note 30.
33 126 Ohio St. 42, 183 N.E. 873, 92 A.L.R. 15 (1932).
34 See Railroad Co. v. Kassen, 49 Ohio St. 230, 31 N.E. 282 (1892). Compare para-
graph 3 of syllabus, "after becoming aware of the danger," and paragraph 1, "after he
became aware, or ought to have become aware, of the plaintiff's danger"; Erie Ry. Co.
v. McCormick, 69 Ohio St. 45, 68 N.E. 571 (1903) ("after knowledge of peril"); Drown
v. Northern Ohio Traction Co., 76 Ohio St. 234, 81 N.E. 326 (1907) (Doctrine seemingly
limited in per curiam opinion to situations where "after they see his danger," "after
having notice of plaintiff's peril could have avoided the injury"); West v. Gillette, 95
Ohio St. 305, 116 N.E. 521 (1917) (Syllabus refers to "actual knowledge" but as pointed
out by Jones, J., in dissent, trial court in charge used language "after he had discovered,
or by the exercise of ordinary care, ought to have discovered," and judgment for plain-
tiff affirmed); Penn. Co. v. Hart, 101 Ohio St. 196, 128 N.E. 142 (1920); Cleveland
Ry. Co. v. Wendt, 120 Ohio St. 197, 165 N.E. 737 (1929) ("ought to have seen" prin-
ciple rejected in opinion of Jones, J.-not contained in syllabus).
35 Brock v. Marlatt, 128 Ohio St. 435, 191 N.E. 703 (1934); Schaaf v. Coen, 131
Ohio St. 279, 2 N.E.2d 605 (1936); Cole v. New York Central Ry. Co., 150 Ohio St.
175, 80 N.E.2d 854 (1948).
36 Schaaf v. Coen, 131 Ohio St. 279, 2 N.E.2d 605 (1936).
37 Since no antecedent negligence of plaintiff is referred to in the case except the
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To apply the doctrine of last clear chance, the negligence of the
plaintiff must be antecedent and an instruction on that issue is not
proper where the negligence of the defendant and that of the plaintiff
are concurrent38
One of the chief difficulties with the question of last clear chance
is ascertaining the proper method of placing it in issue. The matter
of pleading as applied to last clear chance is the subject of an extensive
annotation39 and of a law review note.4 0
In Ohio it now is well settled that the plaintiff, in order to rely
on last clear chance, has the burden of alleging facts in his petition
giving rise thereto. In Drown v. Northern Ohio Traction Co.,41 the
third paragraph of the syllabus reads:
Since the plaintiff can recover only upon the allegations of his peti-
tion, he cannot recover upon negligence which warrants the applica-
tion of the rule of "last chance" without alleging it in his petition.
In the Masterson case,' the third paragraph of the syllabus states
in part:
A petition, setting forth a state of facts as a basis for the applica-
tion of the doctrine of last chance but which, in that connection,
merely alleges that defendant saw or could have seen the plaintiff
in a perilous situation is insufficient to invoke the rule; ....
While the last clear chance rule presupposes antecedent fault or
negligence on the part of the plaintiff,43 the Masterson case also held
that a plaintiff might plead in the same petition a case of ordinary
negligence and also plead a state of facts invoking the last clear chance
rule, and recover on whichever aspect the proof in the case assumed.
The opinion of Jones, J., states that there is no inconsistency in such
pleadings "nor need the pleader confess his own negligence in order
to invoke the rule." Thus it would appear that while plaintiff need
not necessarily allege the antecedent facts which caused him to be
placed in a perilous situation to invoke last clear chance, he must
failure to leave the stalled car before she actually did, and since it was held that the trial
court was in error in directing a verdict because such conduct was not necessarily negli-
gence, quaere, is this case actually one of last dear chance in the sense this term is
customarily used? Last clear chance assumes that plaintiff by his own fault or negligence
has placed himself in a perilous position. See syllabi in Masterson case and Brock case.
38 Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Wendt, 120 Ohio St. 197, 165 N.E. 737 (1929); Brock v.
Marlatt, 128 Ohio St. 435, 191 N.E.2d 703 (1934).
39 25 A.L.R.2d 257.
40 Note 3 W. Res. L. Rev. 87 (1951).
41 76 Ohio St. 234, 81 N.E. 326 (1907).
42 126 Ohio St. 42, 183 N.E. 873, 92 A.L.R. 15 (1932).
43 Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Wendt, supra note 38; Brock v. Marlatt, supra note 38.
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allege facts which support a conclusion (1) that he was in a perilous
situation, (2) that defendant was actually aware of such peril, and
(3) that defendant by the exercise of ordinary care after such dis-
covery should have avoided the accident but defendant, after such
discovery, failed to exercise ordinary care.
By the use of the alternative pleading thus permitted, plaintiff
can allege facts to support an eventual argument that he was not
negligent in any respect but that even if he be found to be negligent,
such negligence was antecedent to his position of peril, that the sub-
sequent negligence of the defendant under last clear chance was the
sole proximate cause of the injury or damage, and that plaintiff's
antecedent negligence was not a proximate cause.
In some jurisdictions the courts have taken the position that last
clear chance need not be specially pleaded and that it can be raised
under a petition charging in general terms negligence which was the
proximate cause of the injury.4 4 Many of these decisions seem to
turn on the question of whether a general allegation of negligence is
permitted, a procedural pleading problem not peculiar to last clear
chance. Others seem to emphasize the concept that last clear chance,
being concerned with the question of proximate cause as it would
apply to plaintiff's negligence, is in effect defensive matter to an
affirmative claim by defendant of contributory negligence on the part
of plaintiff. Even where the procedural statutes of a state permit a
general allegation of negligence, however, where the plaintiff in his
petition alleges specific acts of the defendant which clearly do not call
for the application of the doctrine of last clear chance, there is au-
thority for the proposition that he will be limited to the proof of such
facts and may not, on the basis of such pleading, import the issue of
last clear chance into the case.4 Many other jurisdictions take the
position, as held in Ohio in the Drown case and the Masterson case
that before the plaintiff can rely on last clear chance, he must plead
facts giving rise thereto in his petition.46
Some jurisdictions have taken the position that in order to invoke
the doctrine, the plaintiff must confess initial negligence in creating
his perilous situation and avoid this admission by alleging facts setting
up the defendant's subsequent negligence. 47 Most jurisdictions, how-
ever, have held that such an admission need not be made and are in
accord with the rule of the Masterson case in such respect.48
44 See cases listed 25 A.L.R.2d at pages 265-267.
45 See cases listed 25 A.L.R.2d at page 273, 274.
46 See cases listed 25 AJ,.R.2d at pages 259, 260.
47 See cases listed 25 A.L.R.2d at page 288.
48 See cases listed 25 A.L.R.2d at page 289.
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It has been suggested that a very simple solution to the problem
of pleading of last clear chance is to permit a plaintiff to raise the issue
by way of reply.49 This assertion is based on the premise that since
contributory negligence is an affirmative defense and since a reply
consisting of the elements of last clear chance meets such defense, it
properly should be contained in the reply. Actually, however, last
clear chance is more than a defense to a claim of contributory negli-
gence. It also is a cause of action in and of itself.
This can be illustrated by reference to antecedent and subsequent
negligence. Plaintiff, by alleging facts claiming antecedent negligence
on the part of defendant, seeks to recover based on such facts. In
the words of Revised Code section 2309.04, this is his statement of
facts constituting his cause of action. By way of defense to this claim,
defendant's answer alleges antecedent negligence on the part of plain-
tiff which, if established, would be a complete defense to the only
negligence alleged in the petition-antecedent negligence of the de-
fendant. Then, by way of reply, plaintiff alleges other subsequent facts
to bring into play last clear chance-alleging his perilous situation,
the defendant's knowledge thereof, and the defendant's failure there-
after to exercise ordinary care.
While proof of subsequent negligence on the part of defendant
as last clear chance may have the effect of removing plaintiff's
antecedent negligence as a dispositive element in the case, it likewise
would have the effect of removing defendant's antecedent negligence
as a dispositive element in the case, and liability would be predicated
solely on defendant's subsequent negligence. In other words, the sub-
sequent negligence of defendant does not merely erase the antecedent
negligence of the plaintiff as a matter of proximate cause, and thus
permit the plaintiff to recover on the allegations of his petition-
antecedent negligence of the defendant. In the eyes of the law the
antecedent negligence of the plaintiff is a complete defense to any
cause of action based on the antecedent negligence of the defendant.
It is not a defense to a cause of action based on the subsequent negli-
gence of the defendant under the doctrine of last clear chance. Thus,
the very negligence which would be the basis of recovery and the only
basis for such recovery would not be contained in the petition but
only in the reply. In Ohio, however, a plaintiff is entitled to recover
only on the causes of action set out in his petition, and if he seeks to
introduce new causes of action in his reply, it is a departure.50
49 Note 3 W. Res. L. Rev. 87 (1951).
50 Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, 68 Ohio St. 520, 67 N.E. 1052 (1903); Mehurin
v. Stone, 37 Ohio St. 49 (1881); Millersport Woolen Mills Co. v. Titus, 35 Ohio St. 253
(1879); Durbin v. Fisk, 16 Ohio St. 533 (1866).
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While there are some cases holding that last clear chance may
first be raised by reply, some of these are in states where such could
be proved under the general allegations of negligence in the petition.
Others hold that such is a departure on the basis that the reply set
up an independent right of recovery which relegated the antecedent
negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant to the background.51
While the Ohio cases holding that facts giving rise to last clear
chance must be pleaded in the petition have not discussed in detail the
reason for such requirement, it would appear that these cases neces-
sarily hold that the facts which give rise to this doctrine are the facts
"constituting his cause of action" within the purview of Revised Code
section 2309.04, and are facts as to which plaintiff has both the burden
of proof and the burden of pleading.
51 See 25 A.L.R.2d at pages 277-279.
